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Abstract: Erik J. Wielenberg argues that William Lane Craig’s 
understanding of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) is logically 
incoherent. According to Craig’s account, God was timeless or atemporal 
without the universe, but created the universe (including time itself) and 
entered into time (or became temporal) at the moment of creation. 
Wielenberg argues, however, that this account entails that (i) the first 
cause of time is both timeless and temporal at the first moment of time, 
and (ii) the beginning of time is both caused and uncaused. In this article, 
I respond to Wielenberg’s objections and show that they are unsuccessful. 
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In a recent article, Erik J. Wielenberg (2021) argues that William Lane Craig’s 
(2018a; 2018b) understanding of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) is 
problematic. More precisely, Wielenberg (2021, 86) argues that “Craig’s theistic 
explanation for the origin of the universe is logically contradictory. It entails that 
the first cause is both timeless and temporal at t1, and it entails that the beginning 
of time both has a cause and is an uncaused agent-causal event”. Hence, 
according to Wielenberg, Craig’s view of creatio ex nihilo entails two logical 
inconsistencies. This is a rather unfortunate conclusion for Craig and those, such 
as myself, who agree with him. 
Now, in its most basic form, the traditional doctrine of creatio ex nihilo states 
that God brought the universe into existence without the use of pre-existing 
physical stuff. However, there are various ways to flesh out creatio ex nihilo and, 
in turn, various views or understandings of creatio ex nihilo exist (see, for example, 
Erasmus 2018, 15–40). Nevertheless, for simplicity, I will hereafter refer to Craig’s 
(and my) view simply as ‘Craig’s Creation Hypothesis’ (CCH). What, then, is 
CCH? Essentially, it is the view that God was timeless or atemporal without the 





(or became temporal) at the moment of creation. In other words, according to 
CCH, God is timeless without the universe (or timeless ‘prior’ to creating the 
universe, so to speak) because He alone existed at that point and His existence 
involved no change (which implies that reality, at that point or in that state, 
involved no temporal change or flow). However, at the moment of creation, God 
enters into time, or becomes temporal, because of His interaction with the 
temporal, created world.1 Consequently, God is timeless without the universe, 
and temporal from the moment of creation onwards. 
CCH surely appears to some people (especially non-theists) as a strange or 
bizarre view and, admittedly, it is an uncommon view amongst theists.2 
Nevertheless, why think that CCH is, not merely bizarre, but also logically 
impossible?3 Wielenberg presents two reasons for thinking this. His first grievance 
is stated as follows: 
 
Since time begins with the creation of the universe, if there is some event that 
occurs at a given time, then the universe exists at that time, and hence God is 
temporal at that time. [The event in which God creates the universe] occurs at t1, 
which implies that the universe exists at t1, and hence God is temporal at t1. 
Therefore, when God exercises His causal power to create the universe, He is 
temporal rather than timeless, and the first cause is therefore temporal rather than 
timeless. But … the first cause must be timeless; otherwise, how could it have the 
power to create time itself? … God must be temporal at t1 because the universe 
exists at t1; yet He must be timeless at t1 in order to have, at t1, the power to create 
the universe … —a contradiction. (Wielenberg 2021, 81–82) 
 
This is a mouthful, so let us chew it over. Wielenberg’s first concern with CCH is 
that it unwittingly implies that, at the moment of creation (which we will denote 
as ‘t1’), God must be both temporal and timeless. On the one hand, God must be 
temporal at t1 because time exists at t1 and God is temporal whenever time exists. 
In other words, God must be temporal (according to CCH) during the event in 
which He creates time, an event that begins at t1. Consequently, God is the 
temporal first cause of the universe. On the other hand, God must be timeless at 
t1 because only a timeless divine being can create time, or cause time to exist. In 
 
1 For example, one argument in support of this claim is (very briefly) the following: assuming 
the tense theory of time, God as an omniscient being must know tensed facts, such as ‘It is raining 
in Cape Town at the moment’ or ‘It is now t1’. However, knowledge of such tense facts is changing 
knowledge (since these tense facts change) and, hence, God’s knowledge is constantly changing. 
This implies that God is temporal. 
2 It seems that most theists hold either that God is timeless or that God is temporal. Not many 
theists affirm that God is timeless without creation but temporal subsequent to creation.  
3 After all, many of us affirm bizarre views that (as far as we know) are not logically 
inconsistent, such as the view that gravity is, essentially, the curvature of spacetime (as implied 
by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity), or the view that our mothers-in-law actually like us. 




other words, time itself cannot have a temporal cause for its existence. 
Consequently, God is the timeless first cause of the universe. We thus reach a 
contradiction that is most unpleasant for the proponents of CCH: (i) God is the 
temporal first cause of the universe, and (ii) God is the timeless first cause of the 
universe. Loosely speaking, Wielenberg’s objection is that CCH entails that God’s 
timeless-ness and His temporal-ness overlap, or both occur simultaneously, at 
the moment of creation (t1). 
What shall we think about this objection? First, we should note that CCH does 
not claim that God is timeless at t1 but, rather, as regards God’s atemporality, it 
merely claims that God is timeless without or sans the universe. Contra 
Wielenberg (2021, 82), Craig and friends, as to my knowledge, do not claim that 
the first cause must necessarily be atemporal ‘at t1’,4 but they happily affirm that 
God is, or ‘becomes’, temporal at t1. Hence, there is no explicit contradiction in 
CCH. But Wielenberg will surely not be pleased with this response to his 
objection, as he might still intuit that something is amiss with the notion of CCH. 
Even if the contradiction is not explicit, it might still be implicit, for there seems 
to be something murky behind the scenes of CCH. 
Perhaps this murkiness results from the fact that the issues surrounding the 
nature of time are knotty, and various views of time are out there. This is 
expected because, although we have an intimate experience with time, we still 
struggle to understand or explain or perceive what, exactly, time is. Consider, for 
example, the debate about substantivalism versus relationism as regards time. 
Substantivalism is the view that time is an entity that may exist with no change, 
that is, time is what makes change possible and it is distinct from any event or 
sequence of events. Relationism, on the other hand, is the view that no time exists 
without change; time just is the set of temporal relations between things or the 
sequence of all events ordered by the relation earlier than. Which is more 
plausible, substantivalism or relationism? Or consider the debate over the A-
theory (or the tense or dynamic theory), according to which objects are located in 
time by tenses (or the properties of being past, being present, and being future), and 
the B-theory (or the tenseless or static theory), according to which objects are 
located by dates (or the relations of being earlier than, being simultaneous with, and 
being later than). Is the A-theory or the B-theory correct? Or again, consider the 
issues related to the distinction between physical time (i.e., time as understood 
in contemporary physics) and metaphysical time (i.e., time as understood in a 
metaphysical sense that extends beyond physical reality to non-physical reality, 
such as God’s thoughts). Is this a legitimate distinction? Does Einstein’s Special 
Theory of Relativity give us reason to do away with metaphysical time? Is 
 
4 Even the quotations of Craig that Wielenberg (2021, 82) presents in support of this claim do 





physical time merely a measure of metaphysical time? These are but some of the 
many issues related to CCH, issues that ought to be addressed in order to deal 
with CCH responsibly. 
Fortunately, Craig (2000a; 2000b; 2001) has dealt with all these and other 
related issues in painstaking detail.5 For example, Craig (2001, 267) recognises the 
problem posed by Wielenberg: 
 
Now if time had a beginning at some moment in the finite past, it follows that God 
sans the universe exists atemporally, even if subsequent to the moment of creation 
He is temporal. Now prima facie such a conclusion seems bizarre, even incoherent. 
For on such a view there seem to be two phases of God’s life, which stand to each 
other in a relation of earlier/later than. But a timeless phase can hardly be coherently 
said to exist earlier than a temporal phase of God’s life. 
 
Craig then goes on to offer a solution to this problem. In a nutshell, Craig revises 
the Padgett-Swinburne solution (which seems to be some form of 
substantivalism of metaphysical time) such that the changeless state that is prior 
to our time is not merely metric-less, but also involves no discrete intervals. 
Perhaps we may understand the solution rather loosely as follows. 
Let us distinguish between an instant and an event. An instant is an undivided 
temporal point, whereas an event is a change from one instant to another. 
Accordingly, at any instant, the world (or reality) is in some state (think of a 
photograph); and during any event, the world changes from one state to another 
(think of a roll of film flowing from one frame to the next). Now, let ‘tn’ denote 
some instant in the world’s timeline, and let ‘e(n, n+1)’ denote some event in 
which the world changes from the state at tn to the state at tn+1, where n is some 
positive natural number. Then, assuming that time had a beginning, the world’s 
timeline comprises the instants: t1, t2, t3, … tn.6 But t1 is not the very first event; 
rather, the first event is e(t1, t2), the second event is e(t2, t3), and so on. 
Consequently, we may say that, at t1, the world is in a ‘timeless’ state in the sense 
that there was no prior states and no change has occurred (think of the very first 
frame of a roll of film). This state (at t1) would be the state in which God alone 
 
5 Some other authors have addressed similar issues. For example, Alan G. Padgett (1992) 
argues that God is in His own relative, non-measured time (or relative timelessness) and that God 
created the universe, with its measured time, such that He ‘can enter into our space or Measured 
Time at will’ (Padgett 1992, 130).  And Richard Swinburne (1993) argues that God was in His own 
undifferentiated time (which may be referred to as a timeless state in light of its changelessness) 
prior to His creation of our time. See also the interesting discussion in Leftow (1991). 
6 We are, of course, describing time as having one initial instant as opposed to, say, being a 
left-open interval. Moreover, I am using the term ‘tn’ merely as a conceptual marker as a point in 
time and, thus, if one insists that, for any tn and tn+1, conceptually there are an infinite number of 
instants between tn and tn+1, then this would not affect the conclusion of my argument. 




exists without the universe and without any change having occurred. God could 
have remained in this state if He so wished. Fortunately for us, however, God 
decided to create the universe, and His creative act results in the very first event 
e(t1, t2) in which time as we know it (intuitively as the temporal sequence of 
events) begins. In other words, from e(t1, t2) onwards, our time exists and God 
may be said to be temporal in light of His knowledge of tensed facts and the 
changing world. 
Let us put it differently for some extra clarity. Think of a possible world W in 
which God alone exists and in which no change has occurred—reality has been 
in no previous state, and no change from one state to another has occurred. Now, 
one is obviously justified in thinking that W involves or contains just one timeless 
state in light of its changelessness or, in other words, W involves only one state 
that is neither temporally prior nor posterior to any other state. Importantly, the 
state in W is intrinsically similar to the initial state (IS) of reality before any change 
took place.7 Of course, once the first event occurs (or reality changes from the IS 
to another state) then the IS may be said to ‘occur’ at t1, the first instant of time. 
However, when reality was in the IS, then there were no sequence of events and 
the IS may rightfully be described as timeless; the IS only undergoes an extrinsic 
change of becoming temporal (or part of time, or being located at a temporal 
instance) once the first event occurs.8 
As an analogy, consider the first metal ring R1 of a steel chain. When the chain 
has not yet been made and R is not attached to any chain, then R1 is (obviously) 
not part of the chain and has no location in the chain. However, once the chain is 
being formed (i.e., another metal ring R2 is added to R1, R3 is added to R2, and so 
on), then the chain comes into existence and has indexes, and R1 undergoes an 
extrinsic change in which it becomes part of the chain and obtains a location or 
position in the chain. Likewise, God (similar to R1) may be described as timeless 
 
7 Craig (2001, 271) puts it as follows: ‘The impression that the state of affairs of God existing 
changelessly sans creation is timeless may be reinforced by a thought experiment: think of God 
in a changeless, solitary state in a possible world W* in which He freely refrains from creation. In 
such a world, it is entirely plausible and coherent to conceive of such a state as timeless. But no 
intrinsic difference exists between such a state and the state of affairs of God existing sans creation 
in the actual world. The allegedly initial segment of the actual world TW is perfectly similar to 
the world W*. It seems groundless to say that in one world God is temporal in such a state and 
in the other world atemporal’. 
8 Craig (2001, 271) remarks, ‘Now the only possible reason we could have for calling such a 
static state temporal is that temporal states of affairs obtain after it. But insofar as the state of 
affairs of God existing sans the universe obtains, there are, of course, no temporal states of affairs, 





in the initial state (since time, or at least a sequence of events, does not exist at 
this state); and God may be described as temporal from the first event onwards.9 
To be sure, this brief account of metaphysical time and CCH is terse and rather 
loose. Nevertheless, it does illustrate how God can be ‘timeless’ without creation 
and temporal subsequent to creation. Such an account might be odd (although, I 
find it rather attractive), but it is surely not logically impossible. Regrettably, 
Wielenberg does not address this account. Indeed, he misunderstands CCH: ‘… 
on Craig’s view, the temporal event of the universe beginning is caused by God 
in His timeless phase but all temporal events caused by God are caused while He 
is in his temporal phase. Therefore, God must be in His timeless phase and His 
temporal phase at once—an impossibility’ (Wielenberg 2021, 82). The confusion 
in this quotation is clear, since God’s creating the universe and God’s becoming 
temporal occur simultaneously at t2 (or during e(t1, t2), if you will), and God 
possesses His causal powers at all instances (t1, t2, t3, … tn); hence, there is no 
inconsistency. So much for Wielenberg’s first objection, which turns out to be 
toothless. 
What about Wielenberg’s second objection? According to Wielenberg (2021, 
84–85), God’s act of creating time and time’s beginning to exist are the same event 
and, since the former is uncaused, the latter must also be uncaused. Hence, CCH 
entails that the first event is both caused and uncaused. This objection confuses 
an event (as a temporal duration) with the state of affairs within the event. A 
bowling ball’s resting on a mattress and the mattress’ having an indent might 
occur during the same time period—or event—but they are distinct state of 
affairs, and the one may cause the other. Likewise, God’s act of creation and 
time’s beginning are distinct state of affairs, and the former may cause the latter, 
even if they are simultaneous or within the same temporal duration. Of course, 
the term ‘event’ may refer to (i) a state of affairs that happens or takes place, or 
to (ii) a temporal duration. Nevertheless, to confuse these meanings in an 
argument, as Wielenberg does, is to commit the fallacy of equivocation. 
In summary, then, we may conclude that Wielenberg has not shown that it is 
logically impossible for God to be timeless without creation and temporal 
subsequent to creation.10 
 
9 One reviewer asks, ‘Is a decision not also an event?’ In other words, if God has libertarian 
free will, then does God not undergo a change from an undecided state to create to a decided state to 
create at t1 and, if so, does this not undercut CCH? Well, yes, assuming that God has libertarian 
free will and could refrain from his creative act, God surely undergoes a change in which he 
decides to create the universe ‘now’. However, this change would not occur at t1 or at God’s initial 
static, changeless state but, rather, it would occur at t2 (or, more precisely, it would be the event 
involving the change from t1 to t2). Plausibly, this change is simultaneous with God’s actual act 
of creation. Consequently, there is no problem if God’s creative act involves a free decision. 
10 I am thankful to the anonymous referees who provided me with some excellent feedback on 
an earlier draft of the paper. 
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